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Abstract The Paris Agreement cemented a new framework for global climate policy based on
the voluntary and non-legally binding emission reduction actions by both developed and
developing countries. The building blocks strategy for climate action discussed in this Special
Issue is well adapted to and strongly complements this new structure. Building blocks focus on
multiple transnational mechanisms for mobilizing a wide range of both public and private
actors to take actions that reduce emissions by capturing incentives other than climate
mitigation as such. The initial commitments by countries under the Paris Agreement are
insufficient to meet the level of action required to stabilize the global climate system at a safe
level. As such, new voluntary action by public and private actors will be required. The building
blocks strategy, and the examples presented in this Special Issue, offers answers to the question
of how to generate and design smaller-scale initiatives.
The Paris Agreement cemented an entirely new framework for the global climate regime, one
based on countries’ voluntary emissions limitation plans (nationally determined contributions
or NDCs) and which includes participation by both developing and developed countries on a
continuum of mitigation capability rather than a dichotomy. The previous framework, embod-
ied in the principles of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, aimed for universal agreement
on economy-wide, binding, top-down quantitative targets and timetables for developed coun-
tries while excepting developing countries. Given the inherent difficulties in reaching interna-
tional agreement under this approach (Stewart et al. 2013a), decomposition of climate policy
into smaller problem-solving components was proposed as a crucial step toward effective
global cooperation (Aldy and Stavins 2007; Victor 2011).
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Despite the Paris Agreement being potentially the best agreement which could have been
reached under the circumstances (Bodansky 2016), it is insufficiently ambitious to limit the global
mean temperature increase to 2 °C (UNFCCC 2015)—additional climate action will be required.
As the NDCswere supposedly themaximum that countries were able or willing to do individually,
any additional action over the same period will be taken primarily by non-state actors or countries
acting cooperatively in other contexts. And although there has been increased climate action by
non-state actors, this has not happened at a convincing scale in the context of a 2 °C objective.
While the concept of bottom-up action on climate is not novel—it was much discussed
during the lull in the international negotiations and international climate action in advance of
Copenhagen (Aldy and Stavins 2007)—the Paris Agreement is novel in that it brings disag-
gregated bottom-up action into an international framework. Some climate negotiators have
suggested that a focus on non-state actors will reduce the pressure on countries to fulfill their
NDCs and to make more ambitious commitments in the future. Therefore, to be most effective,
the additional action should seek to strengthen the international regime created in Paris.
This Special Issue is focused on how to incentivize this additional climate action through a
building blocks strategy and to do so in a way that enhances the Paris Agreement. The building
blocks strategy is a bottom-up strategy designed to create an array of smaller-scale, specialized
initiatives for transnational cooperation in particular sectors and/or geographic areas with a wide
range of participants—private sector, NGOs, international organizations, and subnational and local
governments, as well as national governments. Key to the building blocks initiatives are a focus on
the non-climate incentives of actions that also have a climate benefit. Such incentives include
private economic benefits, reduction of local and regional air pollution, economic development and
energy security for countries, and mission advancement for development funders.
The building blocks strategy provides not only a theory of action but also a template for
designing these initiatives and offers suggestions on how to generate momentum to develop
these initiatives. It can strengthen the Paris Agreement in three ways: (1) by providing
additional climate action by state and non-state actors in the short term; (2) by understanding
opportunities and costs of increased action, it can help countries to increase the ambition in
subsequent NDCs; and (3) by developing transparency and monitoring systems in building
blocks initiatives, they may provide best practices and examples for the development of similar
systems under the Paris Agreement, which are currently thinly defined (Bodansky 2016).
In this introduction to the Special Issue, we first provide a summary of the theory of
building blocks that we have developed in greater detail in several earlier publications (Stewart
et al. 2013a, b, 2015). We articulate the specific institutional logics of the building blocks
strategy—clubs, institutional linkages, and dominant market actors—providing examples of
initiatives that follow these logics. As well, we introduce the other papers of the Special Issue,
noting how they complement and extend the building blocks proposal. Finally, we discuss how
the building blocks can enhance the Paris Agreement and how the Paris Agreement can, in
turn, enhance the development and stability of building blocks initiatives.
1 The building blocks conception and institutional paradigms
The core elements of the building blocks conception are as follows:
1. Enlist a limited number of public and/or private actors.
2. Focus on sectors and opportunities with high mitigation potential.
Climatic Change
3. Tap actor incentives other than a desire to promote climate mitigation.
4. Establish special-purposed initiatives that mobilize such incentives to generate transna-
tional cooperative activities that reduce GHG emissions.
5. The arrangements need not be legally binding or formally linked to the UNFCCC.
The building blocks approach deploys three institutional logics for operationalizing this
conception.
Club strategy This strategy involves limited membership transnational regimes that produce
economic or other non-climate benefits exclusively or primarily for participants through
cooperative activities that also reduce emissions. These targeted non-climate benefits may
include reduced energy costs, energy security, profitable R&D innovations, and competitive
advantage including through first-mover advantages and reputational benefits. Participants
include states, international organizations, and the private sector, and the non-climate benefits
only accrue to those that actively participate in the club.
Linkage strategy This strategy leverages existing transnational organizations with missions
other than climate protection. By tapping strategically situated actors or members with the
organization that support mitigation, initiatives can be launched that further the organization’s
basic mission while also achieving emission reductions. Examples are rural renewable energy
and low-GHG agriculture in bilateral and multilateral development programs and increasing
the purview of the Montreal Protocol to include currently unregulated ozone-depleting sub-
stances (ODS; Ovodenko 2016) or ODS substitutes that are also GHGs.
Dominant market actor strategy The third strategy reduces emissions through the power
of governmental authorities or business firms with a dominant economic position in specific
global or regional market sectors that enables them to effectively determine or strongly
influence the regulatory norms governing the sector. The dominant actor may or may not
have climate protection objectives; firms in the sector must comply in order to comply with
law and remain competitive. In another model, single or small groups of actors may simply
exercise market power to determine a technological direction favorable to emission reduction.
The building blocks strategies, which mobilize different types of incentives through
different institutional structures, avoid many of the problems experienced in achieving a
binding comprehensive international agreement on emissions limitations.
First, experience shows that it is often easier to reach agreement among a smaller number of
participants on substantive goals as well as critically important institutional and procedural
issues such as monitoring and other arrangements to ensure compliance (Carin and
Mehlenbacher 2010). The building blocks initiatives are not designed either to be comprehen-
sive in scope or inclusive of all actors. InGeoffrey Heal and Howard Kunreuther’s article in
this Special issue, they focus on the development of a tipping set of countries within the
international climate negotiations. They argue that with a limited set of actors with strategic
power, policy choices by the set can raise the net return of all other actors which make the
same policy choices and therefore make the selection of the policy choice more likely. They
suggest that 2014 US–China joint announcement on climate change could be a tipping set on
the road to the Paris Agreement (Heal and Kunreuther 2017).
Second, the incentive to reduce emissions varies widely across countries and is rarely an
incentive for non-state actors. An inclusive comprehensive regime cannot be built on the
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intense support in some jurisdictions and the lack of interest or hostility in others, without
tremendous side payments (Barrett 2003). The building blocks strategy adapts to this challenge
by mobilizing incentives that matter to a range of actors, such as economic gains, increased
adaptation capacity and health, economic development, energy security, and other benefits.
The regimes would, however, be designed so as to produce emissions reductions as a side or
supplemental benefit of cooperation. The strategy also draws on existing pockets of support for
mitigation, including in governments unwilling to commit to economy-wide emissions caps
but willing to participate in more limited undertakings.
Third, as in any regime, theremust bemethods tomonitor participants’ adherence to the rules of
the regime and exclude them from the benefits, where necessary. The varied nature of the building
blocks initiatives allows for experimentation in monitoring and compliance arrangements. Few
building blocks initiatives will require, or have the capacity for, strict trade sanctions like those we
find in theMontreal Protocol orWorld Trade Organization. Some may ensure compliance through
exclusion from club benefits, financing access, or market access, but many others will require
monitoring and compliance regimes that are softer. In JosephAldy’s paper in this Special Issue, he
focuses on the concept of policy surveillance as a tool for monitoring and compliance (Aldy 2017).
He uses the example of the 2009 G20 Fossil Fuel Subsidies Agreement, in which participants
pledged to pursue the same policy objective, created implementation plans subject to peer review,
and then had their performance subject to review by international independent experts. While this
form of policy surveillance may not be appropriate for the Paris Agreement as a whole, it may be
useful in particular types of building blocks initiatives.
Fourth, the benefits of building blocks initiatives extend beyond the immediate emissions
reductions that they achieve. In the climate negotiations, it is often argued that due to the
uncertainty in the costs of climate action, countries should be conservative in their commitments.
Unlocking greater action could be achieved through a better understanding of the costs of action. In
Charles Sabel and David Victor’s article in this Special Issue, he argues that given the smaller
size and lower cost of failure of building blocks initiatives, they can lead to significant learning
about the costs of mitigation action and institutional experimentation that could elucidate the
characteristics of durable initiatives (Sabel and Victor 2017). This could lead leading to additional,
and more effective, future initiatives.
In addition to greater information, building blocks initiatives can also promote increased
trust through demonstrating action for transnational cooperation and creating institutions that
regularize interactions between public and private actors. Initiatives that stimulate subnational
activities with climate co-benefits can mobilize domestic actors to promote adoption of such
measures by their national governments. In these various ways, discrete building blocks
initiatives can lay a basis for greater long-term ambition.
The building blocks strategy advances beyond general calls for bottom-up initiatives and
transnational collaboration by providing specific institutional paradigms for engaging actors in
transnational cooperative activities that reduce emissions. The club, linkage, and dominant
actor paradigms provide a systemic framework for policy entrepreneurs to assess potential
initiatives and analyze the incentives and actors that would be required to mobilize each
initiative.
1.1 Clubs
Since our earlier papers on the use of clubs for climate (Stewart et al. 2013a, b, 2015), there has
been much discussion of a range of plurilateral cooperative mechanisms to achieve emission
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reductions (Weischer et al. 2012; Sabel and Victor 2017; Nordhaus 2015a, b; Falkner 2016).
Some of these arrangements—often referred to as Bclubs^—stray far from the classic eco-
nomic model of club goods: the provision to members of excludable, non-rival goods through
essentially contractual institutional arrangements (Buchanan 1965). Many Bclub^ proposals
are not rigorous about the participants’ incentives and quite often rely on climate altruism—a
non-excludable public good that may be robust and durable for only a very limited number of
public and private actors. What matters, however, is not the label but clarity that only a certain
incentives set can keep actors in an arrangement that does not require external enforcement
(Green 2017). The type and strength of the incentives (club good benefits) will determine the
type and strength of obligations that can be imposed on the members by the arrangement and
the climate co-benefits generated. We propose a continuum of club-like arrangements that run
from classic economic clubs to pseudo-clubs, to coalitions, which are much looser forms of
cooperation, such as C40, to share information and advance a common agenda. Along the
continuum, the benefits to the members become less excludable and the incentives weaker,
although some free riding on benefits may occur even in classic clubs. In Philip Hannam,
Vitor Vasconcelos, Simon Levin, and Jorge Pacheco’s paper in this Special Issue, the
authors produce a model that challenges the traditional understanding that goods must be
fully excludable in order for clubs to be viable. Through examples from a variety of different
regimes, they show that sustained cooperation on public goods is possible even where the
good is not fully excludable and where there is free riding.
1.1.1 Classic clubs
These are arrangements, usually of a limited number of actors, which produce a tangible good
(e.g., new technology, pooled finance, pooled risk, and common standards) that confers
excludable economic or other non-climate benefits such as reduced energy costs, energy
security, or profitable R&D innovations. Defection from the club is managed by limiting club
benefits to members who abide by its rules. If the benefits of membership are greater than the
costs, then the club is essentially self-enforcing—no rational actor is likely to exit the club
barring a fundamental change in circumstances. Monitoring arrangements are needed to ensure
that all members abide by the club bargain.
In their article for the Special Issue, Nathaniel Keohane, Annie Petsonk, and Alex
Hanafi propose a Bclub of carbon markets^ that would link carbon markets from jurisdictions
that met minimum eligibility criteria (e.g., emissions targets, domestic legislation covering
compliance and penalties, and commitment to transparent monitoring). They argue that the
incentives to link are significant, including the economic benefits of a broader pool of
emissions credits, institutional sharing for transparency and monitoring, potential safe harbor
on trade challenges, and reputational benefits (Keohane et al. 2017). The club would provide
an excludable benefit by limiting trading with those outside the club and exclusion from
trading for non-compliance.
Another example is an industry club for technology research, development, and deploy-
ment. Club members pay dues in terms of finance, research collaboration, or patent sharing.
The benefit is the joint development of technology and the resulting risk pooling and economic
benefits that result from the commercialization of the technology. For example, the Canada’s
Oil Stands Innovation Alliance is an industry club in which environmentally beneficial
technologies developed by any of the members of the Alliance are shared royalty-free to the
other members (Krugel 2013). Another potential example is the current initiative by a group of
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countries, proceeding under the umbrella of the WTO, to reach agreement on tariff reductions
for green goods (WTO 2016). Such an agreement, to the extent that the tariff reductions were
exclusive, would be considered a classic club. However, if there was not a reciprocal
requirement for reductions, then a green goods club would best be considered a pseudo-club.
The incentives for participation in clubs need not be uniform for all members (Hannam et al
2017). Businesses or some developing countries may join an arrangement in order to receive
economic benefits or other club goods limited to members, while other states and subnational
jurisdictions may join and support the club activities in order to secure emissions reductions, a
global public good. For example, we could imagine clubs to deploy renewable energy on small
islands in which developed countries provide finance to achieve mitigation, technology
companies provide installations and services to earn profits, and developing countries provide
infrastructure support which results in energy, economic, and other local benefits.
1.1.2 Pseudo-clubs
These arrangements are reliant on benefits that are more diffuse, less readily excludable, and
potentially less easily quantifiable. The club goods may be reputational benefits from adopting
standards or labels or the opportunity to influence future public or private regulation and gain
first-mover benefits. Despite these softer club goods, they may be sufficient to sustain this
form of club, but not if it produces significant costs for parties. Jessica Green, in her article in
this Special Issue, uses the example of carbon measurement and disclosure clubs to argue that
despite their limited benefits and excludability, these low-barrier-to-entry pseudo-clubs can
have utility in coordinating actors to solve technical issues. These pseudo-clubs could attract
broad membership, which could be helpful in propagating standards, but she finds that absent
greater incentive (i.e., government regulation), these pseudo-clubs will not move from mon-
itoring to regulating emissions.
Like traditional clubs, monitoring arrangements will be important to ensure that non-
compliance with the rules is minimized. Additionally, institutional arrangements that increase
the reputational benefits by increased publicity of pseudo-club actions, or expand the first-
mover benefits by lobbying for adoption of standards, may help to make pseudo-clubs more
durable.
Pseudo-clubs generally exploit two sets of non-mutually exclusive incentives: first-mover
and reputational benefits. We often see first-mover benefits in situations that involve standard
setting, as in the multi-stakeholder Greenhouse Gas Protocol, which sets emission measure-
ment standards (Green 2017). The incentive to the initial actors is the ability to shape the
developing standard to their benefit. Public and private actors may then use the standards for
various reasons—reputation, demands of investors or supply chain counterparts, influencing
the development of governmental regulatory standards, possible future regulatory credits, and
so on. In these circumstances, the benefits that accrue to the participants may be time-limited.
Once the standard has been propagated, the first-mover benefits may be diluted.
In his paper in this Special Issue, Matthew Potoski examines the second type of incen-
tive—reputation—with the example of green certification clubs. He argues that these types of
pseudo-clubs are attractive to private actors because they create a value that the actors cannot
create themselves, namely, the reputational benefit for being associated with an independent
certification regime (Potoski 2017). The strength of the reputational benefit will depend on the




These arrangements have no excludable club benefit, generally do not require significant
commitments from their members, and the corresponding benefits of information sharing,
discussions fora, and publicity may be similarly small. Unlike clubs and pseudo-clubs,
coalitions generally do not set standards that participants must follow, hence no arrangements
for monitoring compliance. Rather, minimal institutional arrangements to share information or
convene actors will be required.
Many of the arrangements that have been referred at climate negotiations and related events
as clubs are actually coalitions. For example, the C40, the group of global mayors and cities
acting on climate change, is primarily a coalition for information sharing and discussion. No
standards are established or commitments required from participants.
Establishing and building successful clubs, pseudo-clubs, or coalitions involves a number
of challenges. The first is who will have the incentive to incur the costs of start-up organiza-
tion; this may be limited to dominant firms industry, public bodies, or large NGOs. These start-
up costs may be significant as clubs must develop governance arrangements for decision-
making among participants, work out the terms of cooperation, and monitor member perfor-
mance with varying stringency. Second, they must deploy effective exclusionary mechanisms
to limit club benefits to members and punish shirking by members, or be satisfied with lesser
incentives and corresponding benefits. These mechanisms may include arrangements that only
allow members’ access to patented technologies or know-how or preferential trade rules for
members.1 Without such arrangements, clubs will fail for the same reasons that plague
cooperation to provide public goods.
1.2 Linkage
This strategy leverages existing transnational organizations with primary missions other than
climate protection. In some cases, strategically situated organizational actors that support
mitigation may instigate initiatives that further the organization’s basic mission or are coherent
with it while also achieving emissions reductions. Such an approach harnesses the organiza-
tion’s capacities, machinery, and established norms for implementing its non-climate objec-
tives in order to simultaneously advance climate protection.
In the past year, there have been two significant cases in which political pressure by
members of organizations has resulted in new initiatives directed at climate protection. First,
the Montreal Protocol (MP), on the initiative of the USA and the EU, agreed to regulate
hydrofluorocarbons, a class of potent greenhouse gases (Ovodenko 2016). While these are not
ozone-depleting substances, their production was a direct result of the Protocol’s constraints on
ozone-depleting halocarbons. Utilizing the MP was attractive because of its powerful set of
participation and compliance provisions, involving side payments from the Multilateral Fund,
1 The creation of clubs, and the potential of having preferential trade rules among club members, may potentially
be contrary toWTO rules. It is not clear whether the exception concerning regional trade agreements may be used
for thematic, regionally based clubs. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to consider the trade issues.
For a preliminary discussion of the trade law issues surrounding this type of response, see Patrick Low, Gabrielle
Marceau, and Julia Reinaud, The Interface Between the Trade and Climate Change Regimes: Scoping the Issues
6 (World Trade Org., Working Paper No. ERSD-2011-1, 2011). Available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_
e/reser_e/ersd201101_e.pdf.
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substantial technical assistance for technological transitions, and the potential of trade sanc-
tions. The second example is the development of the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme
for International Aviation under the International Civil Aviation Authority (ICAO), under
pressure from domestic regulation on aviation emissions in the EU (Green 2016). Again, the
inclusion of this initiative within ICAO leverages the organization’s institutional framework
for implementation, monitoring, and compliance.
As well, there has been increasing climate action linked to development finance. The
missions of multilateral development banks have already to a certain extent been redirected
away from investment in fossil fuel power projects and toward alternatives. Similarly, the
USA, acting to reinforce its own priorities, negotiated a commitment from China to alter its
large-scale support for coal projects in Asia, for example by changing its criteria for lending
via the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, South–South Cooperation Fund, and other such
institutions (Hannam et al 2017). Existing institutionalized patterns of cooperation among an
institution’s members can be mobilized to support non-climate initiatives that not only
selectively benefit the members but also reduce GHGs. An example is the ASEAN Agreement
on Transboundary Haze Pollution, which could be amended to include an initiative to reduce
not only pollutants that are causing regional haze but also GHGs (Tacconi 2016).
1.3 Dominant market actors
The third strategy attempts to reduce GHG emissions though the power of government
regulators or firms acting from a dominant position in specific global or regional market
sectors. Their dominant position enables them effectively to determine or strongly influence
the standards governing the sector. When this occurs in a sufficiently large market, scale
economy and other considerations may induce producers to follow the standards in producing
for other markets as well. This phenomenon has been analyzed as the California effect
(California motor vehicle emission standards) or the Brussels effect (EU product regulations;
Bradford 2013). Where dominant public or private actors envisage sufficient economic,
strategic, or other gains from acting as first movers with regulatory or market standards, they
may act unilaterally with the goal of inducing others in a sector to follow suit. In some cases,
dominant firms’ influence would be exercised in conjunction with, in anticipation of, or in
order to stimulate supportive government regulatory measures. Dominant public and private
actors may effectively collaborate. Cause and effect is not easily separable, as in the example
of synergy between DuPont’s interests in alternatives to ozone-depleting chemicals and the US
government’s support for a strong Montreal Protocol (Benedick 1998); what matters from our
perspective are contexts where such intentional or fortuitous collaboration is feasible.
A dominant private firm or small group of firms in a market for a given climate-beneficial
technology, such as wind turbine nacelles or grid technologies, may adopt or promote adoption
by governmental authorities of a product or performance standard that will give it a competitive
advantage but also secure greenhouse gas reductions. Government regulators may leverage
market power to advance climate protection as such. An example of the latter is the extension of
the EU’s emission trading system for regulating domestic emissions to international airlines
serving the European market, which then drove action at ICAO. Similarly, dominant shipping
firms likeMaersk andChina Navigation are pressuring the InternationalMaritimeOrganisation,
and its member states, to develop climate mitigation policies for shipping, the largest economic
sector not subject to international climate regulation (Vidal 2016).
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Emerging renewable energy markets provide another example. Germany’s Renewable
Energy Sources Act of 2000 created a large new market for solar, wind, and bioenergy
technologies. At roughly the same time and perhaps in response, China made a large bet on
marketing solar and wind technologies, increasing the production of photovoltaic panels by
more than 100-fold since 2005 (Wagner et al 2015). Each country exercised immense market
power on the demand and supply sides, respectively, and as a result had a strong and perhaps
revolutionary influence on the price and quantity of renewables. Whether the actions in this
case were intentional or largely serendipitous, future opportunities for fostering such initiatives
should be encouraged, recognized, and exploited.
While in theory a dominant firm or group of firms might already have taken action if they
would thereby benefit, the key element in many contexts is the availability or not of
governmental action that helps change or reinforce the incentives. More broadly, the rational
expectations model gives an imperfect account in such dynamic situations. A role exists for
public and private policy entrepreneurs attentive to evolving market conditions and public
sector preferences.
2 Interaction between building blocks and the UNFCCC: providing benefits
to both
As the building blocks are driven by non-climate incentives, they can continue to be developed
and deployed notwithstanding the UNFCCC and the international climate architecture. Sim-
ilarly, as the primary intergovernmental response to climate change, the UNFCCC can
continue to operate as a states-only club focused on the climate actions of the national
government parties to the Paris Agreement. But the reality is that the Paris Agreement is
insufficiently ambitious to meet its long-term temperature target, and the voluntary building
blocks initiatives are not yet being created at scale.
There are already significant interactions between these two complimentary forms of global
climate action. National governments are participating in, and indeed creating, building blocks
initiatives, and the UNFCCC has for a few years been developing a new action agenda to
engage actors beyond states.
2.1 Building blocks enhancing the political viability and effectiveness of the Paris
Agreement
The building blocks strategy can help strengthen the Paris Agreement in a number of ways.
First, the emissions reductions contained in the NDCs are inadequate to meet the long-term
temperature targets of the Paris Agreement. If this emissions gap between needed action and
actual action continues, it undermines the effectiveness and political viability of the Paris
Agreement. In helping to create additional near-term emissions reductions, it is likely that the
deployment of building blocks initiatives can help strengthen the evolving Paris Agreement.
Second, they can help increase ambition in subsequent NDCs. Many existing NDCs are
highly general in character, containing aggregate emissions reduction targets but little detail on
specific measures to achieve reductions. To be most effective, the future NDCs should describe
the specific regulatory and policy initiatives to reduce emissions and, where appropriate,
descriptions of the support necessary to achieve these reductions.
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Third, the plurilateral, multi-actor nature of building blocks initiatives allows diverse agents
to pool resources and knowledge, experiment with different measures, track performance, and
identify and demonstrate best practices. Such collaboration across diverse initiatives provides
an experiment in governance (Sabel and Victor 2017; Cole 2015) and which will likely require
reliable systems of review and assessment of both climate and non-climate outcomes. The
transparency and compliance regimes of the Paris Agreement are minimally developed at this
point. These regimes will be required to create methodologies to do things they have not done
before (i.e., tracking progress on the fulfillment of policies under NDCs) and include groups of
countries that have not had compliance responsibilities in the past.
2.2 Launching and enhancing initiatives through linking to the UNFCCC
The Paris Agreement starts to engage seriously with the realization that much present and
future climate action will be driven by non-state actors (Chan et al 2016). In addition to
specific language calling on non-state actors to increase their action and to states to engage
with their non-state actors, several new UNFCCC institutions have been created to promote
this engagement. This new orientation will provide significant benefits for the development
and effectiveness of building blocks initiatives.
2.2.1 Facilitating the development of new initiatives
The non-climate incentives at the heart of building blocks initiatives are often more
stable than climate altruism and can draw a limited number of actors into productive and
durable initiatives. However, even where the incentives among a set of actors could be
aligned, policy and institutional initiatives that operationalize such alignments may not
occur. Policy entrepreneurs are key to the emergence of building blocks initiatives. These
entrepreneurs can be individuals, NGOs, firms, or institutions that take the lead in
understanding the opportunities for action; identifying and convening the appropriate
actors; structuring the parameters of the initiative, including any institutional or legal
arrangements; and ultimately launching the initiative. Across the wide breadth of existing
initiatives, we have seen all manner of initiative entrepreneurs: the International Renew-
able Energy Agency in the development of the Island Lighthouses Initiative on renew-
ables in small developing country islands; oil firms in the development of COSIA for the
patent sharing arrangements; and the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) Presi-
dencies of Lima, Paris, and Marrakech in the development of the initiatives that were
announced at their COPs.
This process for creating initiatives is incredibly resource-intense. As a result, we have seen
limited initiatives, even though there are significant opportunities for action. Support for policy
entrepreneurs could be helpful in maximizing the development and uptake of opportunities.
This support could be in the form of information on opportunities in areas of high mitigation
potential, connecting and convening potential actors, sharing best practices on structuring
initiatives, access to technical and financial resources, and providing a platform to gain
visibility.
The UNFCCC, particularly after the Paris Agreement, may actually be one locus of support
to create action outside of it. We know now that the UNFCCC will remain the central focus of
international climate negotiations for at least the near term and that it has significant supportive
resources (e.g., access to the Green Climate Fund, the Global Environment Facility, and the
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Adaptation Fund; know-how in project implementation and monitoring through the Clean
Development Mechanism; and capacity building knowledge through the Durban Forum on
Capacity Building), political participation and focus, and convening power. There are four
aspects of the new agreement that may be helpful in launching new initiatives:
First, as we suggested earlier, enhanced NDCs may provide information on mitigation
opportunities, sectoral gaps, and the political importance accorded to different types of
mitigation. As we have said before, they provide a sort of Bglobal shopping list^ which
entrepreneurs can structure building blocks. The Paris Agreement requires that countries bring
forward new NDCs every 5 years. As this creates a regular system of NDC development (and
is not seen by countries as a one-off thing), it is hoped that these INDCs would become an
integrated part of a country’s national planning process and would therefore contain more
detailed and useful information than the initial set of NDCs.
Second, the Agreement creates a series of political moments (the 2018 Facilitated Dialogue
and post-2020 Global Stocktake) intended to take stock of the Bcollective efforts^ of the
Parties and also have a role in Binforming^ the preparation of the NDCs. The dialogues should
provide information on the aggregate uptake of mitigation activities and, importantly, the
sectors in which there are unrealized opportunities.
Third, the successful Technical Expert Meetings (TEMs) initiated under Workstream 2
of the Durban Platform have been continued until at least 2020. The primary benefit of
these meetings is to create, or uncover, knowledge about emissions reduction opportuni-
ties and their co-benefits—information necessary to structure building blocks—which,
following Paris and Marrakesh, will now be more widely disseminated. A secondary
benefit is the significant opportunities for regime entrepreneurs to participate in the
relevant TEMs and, potentially, collaborate with the Secretariat and Technology Expert
Committee in organizing the TEMs.
Fourth, the Paris COP Decision establishes two mechanisms that will encourage continuous
high-event attention on new initiatives, including building blocks clubs and coalitions. Cur-
rently, a key factor limiting the development of initiatives has been the lack of continuous
attention and pressure. The first mechanism created by the COP Decision is an annual high-
level event focused on near-term action that is to Bprovide an opportunity for announcing new
or strengthened voluntary efforts, initiatives and coalitions.^ The second consists of two high-
level Champions appointed by the current and incoming COP Presidents to steer the high-level
engagement and facilitate Bthe successful execution of existing efforts and the scaling-up
coalitions.^
2.2.2 Enhancing the effectiveness of ongoing initiatives
The Paris Agreement also contains provisions that can help strengthen initiatives that are
already underway by linking them to the UNFCCC and helping to reduce the transaction costs
of the initiative or by creating new financial incentives. There are two specific ways that the
Agreement may be able to accomplish this. One concerns transparency and compliance; the
other is the development of economic incentives for building blocks mitigation through
internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs).
Key components of many building blocks initiatives are transparency and compliance
regimes. Without robust arrangements, it will be difficult to detect and deal with free
riders, which may result in decreased benefit for the initiative participants and for the
climate. However, developing such regimes is costly, and for potential initiatives in which
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the measurable benefits of participation are marginal, this may significantly inhibit their
development. The Paris Agreement will establish new, potentially robust, and universal
transparency and compliance regimes as a part of the work to bring the new Agreement
into force. It is in the interest of countries, which have significant pressure to achieve their
NDCs, to create a transparency regime that draws in mitigation methods from every
possible emissions reduction, including those from non-state actors and transnational
arrangements. Indeed, the NAZCA platform is already a proto-transparency system for
non-state actors within the UNFCCC. To the extent that building blocks initiatives can use
the UNFCCC regimes, it makes the transaction cost of starting new regimes that much
more manageable.
The Paris Agreement also contains provisions concerning the use of markets and crediting
mechanisms. As they are underdeveloped at this point, it is conceivable that the ITMOs,
initially designed to be an authorization for linked emissions trading systems to be used for
NDC fulfillment, could be broadened to provide a system of allocating the emissions reduc-
tions achieved through transnational building blocks action to the various participants in the
initiative. Absent such authorization, it is unclear whether these reductions could be credited to
individual countries accounts for NDC achievement, thus removing a beneficial incentive for
state participation and support in building blocks. However, the ITMO regime should be
allowed and encouraged to be developed in ways that provide a framework for reduction credit
transfers between participants in building blocks initiatives that allows for flexibility and
innovation.
3 Conclusion
Throughout this introduction, we have noted the ways in which building blocks initiatives
have already been undertaken by a range of state and non-state actors. With the Paris
Agreement’s flexible architecture and mechanisms that can be used to increase the develop-
ment of building blocks initiatives, we should expect that there will be an increased deploy-
ment of such initiatives and a corresponding increase in emissions reductions in addition to
those created through the NDCs.
In this introduction, we have outlined the specific strategies to develop building blocks
initiatives—clubs, linkage, and dominant actors—and shown the interactions between the
strategies and with the Paris Agreement. In the articles in the Special Issue that follow, the
excellent collection of authors expand and indeed enhance the concept of the building blocks
initiatives. From them, we learn further about the benefits of starting small, in participants and
subject matter; in correctly identifying the incentives for participation and corresponding costs
that these incentives will bear; of experimenting and creating appropriate institutions that
monitor progress; of not being too focused on theoretical distinctions; and of making bold
proposals.
We hope that this is more than an academic exercise, that it creates a roadmap and a set of
tools that can help inform, support, and influence the work of policy entrepreneurs in building
new initiatives that reduce emissions.
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